On September 3, 1943, the Kingdom of Italy signed an “armistice” with the Allies.  Negotiations had been going on secretly for months with meetings in neutral Portugal by some Italian military leaders under orders of King Victor Emmanuel III.

Mussolini had been arrested on July 25th with the fall of Sicily and Marshal Pietro Badoglio appointed the new Prime Minister. The whole process was a not-so-clever ruse by the King to take Italy out of the war without Hitler being the wiser.  The Germans were told that Mussolini’s ouster would not affect the Axis alliance. It didn’t dawn on any royal conspirators that Mussolini was the only Italian Hitler ever trusted. 

So, through the month of August, Badoglio pretended nothing had changed.  He didn’t secure the Alpine passes lest the Germans get suspicious. He didn’t alert Italy’s scattered armies that the war would take a momentous turn or even move some overseas troops back to defend the homeland.  It was to be a ‘bait & switch’ that would catch the Germans flatfooted.

At Cassibile, Sicily, Italian negotiator Gen. Giuseppe Castellano, right

The Italians considered Italy’s withdrawal from the fighting as an honorable ‘armistice’.  But the agreement that was signed at Cassibile, Sicily called for the total surrender and occupation of Italy. It required all Italian military and merchant ships to immediately sail to Allied bases around the Mediterranean.  Moreover, the Italians had to keep German troops on the peninsula away from ports and air bases until Allied troops arrived. 

Since Mussolini’s arrest, Hitler had sent scores of divisions across the unprotected Alps ostensibly to ‘reinforce’ the peninsula against an expected Allied invasion.  Badoglio and the King had effectively made Italy a Nazi-occupied country.

Although the ‘armistice’ was signed on September 3rd, the Italians didn’t want it made public for weeks until they had prepared their military for the switch.  But General Eisenhower gave them only 5 days to prepare.  On September 8th, the world was told of Italy’s “unconditional surrender.”  On September 9th, the Allies invaded the peninsula at Salerno.  On September 12th, German commandoes rescued Mussolini from his mountaintop prison.  Italy would soon have two governments—Fascist in the north, monarchy in the south—and both German and Allied troops ravaging the peninsula.

Making matters worse, the Italian Army was in total collapse thinking World War II was over for them.  Badoglio had failed miserably in leadership and contingency planning.  The troops were understandably confused, desertions were rampant.  Some courageous unit commanders undertook suicidal action against superior German forces, others laid down their arms only to be massacred by vengeful Germans or deported to German prison camps as traitors.

Mussolini’s new puppet regime in the north managed to create a “republican” army with Italian soldiers released from German prisons.  The southern Kingdom under Badoglio salvaged what was left of its army to assist the Allied war effort.  Italians were now fighting both the Germans and the Allies; worse they began fighting each other in a civil war that went on past the 1945 murder of Mussolini and the surrender of German and Fascist troops.

This tragic episode of Italian history is ripe for Monday morning quarterbacks.  Was it really possible to exit the war under these circumstances?  Was Italy better off fighting alongside the Germans to the bitter end?  Was the overthrow of Mussolini the perquisite for Italy’s exit?

Had Mussolini remained in power and Italian and German troops defended the peninsula, the war would have taken a different turn.  Allied strategy, especially the American one, was to invade Normandy in 1943, not Italy.  Churchill insisted on destroying Italy first to restore Britain’s hegemony in the Mediterranean, the gateway to British India.  Mountainous Italy was the military nightmare that everyone had predicted, but the vast Allied armies had to go somewhere within reach after the successful North African campaign—a rehearsal for Normandy.

Italy in 1943 was a basket case even without an invasion.  Allied air power was bombing it back to the Stone Age.  There were few Allied qualms about leveling the glories of classical or Renaissance Italy—the abbey at Monte Cassino demonstrated that.  But the ground war would unleash consequences even more horrific for civilians.

Was there a better way?  -JLM